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Financial Sector Development and the Macrodynamics of De Facto Dollarisation in 
Developing Countries: The Case of Ghana
by
Deodat E. Adenutsi and Charles Amo Yartey
ABSTRACT
Following the massive economic policy restructuring and reforms since the early 1980s, 
currency substitution, asset substitution and de facto dollarisation have become common 
phenomena in nearly all transition and developing economies. High and persistent inflation 
which have been a perennial feature of developing and transition economies is now known to be 
highly responsible for currency substitution, asset substitution and de facto dollarisation. This 
paper presents evidence on the macrodynamics of de facto dollarisation, currency substitution 
and asset substitution during the era of the implementation of the Financial Sector Adjustment 
Programmes (FINSAPs) in developing and transition economies with special reference to 
Ghana. The study has found out that de facto dollarisation whether in the form of asset 
substitution or currency substitution is highly prevalent and poses a serious threat to fiscal and 
monetary policies effectiveness in developing and transition economies. In Ghana, the principal 
long-run mainspring of de facto dollarisation is the ad hoc implementation of financial sector 
development programme that was embarked upon about two decades ago which has resulted in 
high exchange rate depreciation and price fluctuations. It is, however, likely that as the financial 
sector develops over a long period a time will come when further development of the financial 
sector would no longer instigate de facto dollarisation.  
Keywords: Currency Substitution, Asset Substitution, Dollarisation, Financial Sector 
Development 
JEL Classification Numbers: C20, E52, E58, F31, G15, H26, P2
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The US dollar is widely known or believed to possess some key desirable properties. These 
include the reputation of being a stable currency, and hence it can reliably function as a store of 
value. Besides, it is generally conceived that the US dollar has the highest global availability and 
acceptability as a medium of exchange, and further safeguards foreign users against the threat of 
domestic bank failures, devaluation and inflation. Cash usage preserves anonymity of users 
because it leaves no paper trail of the transaction for which it serves as the means of payment 
hence it is the preferred medium of exchange in underground transactions. Indeed, the very 
characteristics that make the US dollar a popular medium of exchange also makes it difficult to 
determine the exact amount and location of the US currency circulating abroad. Even so, there is 
a direct source of information that can be used to determine the approximate amount of the US 
currency in circulation in different countries. 
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Monetary economists most often relate dollarisation of any kind in transition and developing 
economies to the prevailing conditions of deficiencies of market institutions at the early stage of 
economic development. The cause of dollarisation can then be summarized as the interacting 
consequence of perennial high rates of inflation. This causes the domestic currency to become 
relatively less par excellence than those that have earned a reputation for being relatively 
successful in maintaining their purchasing power over a reasonable period of time. The 
consequence is a constant pressure on the exchange rate, undermining the ability of the central 
bank to maintain the monetary target. Certainly, this negatively affects the effectiveness of 
implementing monetary and fiscal policies towards macroeconomic stability. 
It is quite clear that dollarisation, be it in the form of asset substitution or currency substitution, 
is a product of flexible exchange rate regime. This system makes room for exchange rate 
fluctuations based on the forces of demand and supply in the foreign exchange market. For 
instance, a decline in the demand for domestic money relative to foreign money would increase 
the equilibrium price level. According to the purchasing power parity, strictly given that interest 
rates are determined endogenously, the increased domestic price level will lead to devaluation of 
domestic currency to accommodate the lower money demand, as exchange rate virtually reflects 
the relative price of currencies. 
Nevertheless, consensus has been drawn on the basic property of currency substitution and asset 
substitution or dollarisation, that it is clearly a phenomenon of money demand, a demand for 
multiple mediums of exchange and therefore can be analysed within a money demand functional 
framework that permits simultaneous holding of medium of exchange as well as saving asset 
denominated in different currencies. By incorporating the effects of currency substitution in the 
domestic money demand function, the behaviour of monetary aggregates will be altered.  
It is therefore understood that the extensive presence of foreign currencies in the monetary 
aggregates and their counterparts will inevitably lower the demand for domestic currencies in 
transition and developing economies, while the stability of the velocity of circulation as well as 
the demand for the local currency will also be affected.
The key underlying problem of this study is that in order to develop the financial sector, there is 
the need to implement financial liberalisation programmes and policies that will enhance the 
maximization of the benefits of financial markets through competition, widening and deepening 
of the financial system. Financial liberalisation, however, promotes increased access to foreign 
currencies and foreign denominated financial assets in a domestic economy resulting in increased 
dollarisation and the apparent difficulty in effective monetary policy implementation by central 
banks of developing countries where price and foreign exchange instability and stickiness have 
for long been a permanent feature.
From the foregoing a lot of questions have been left unanswered: What is the extent of de facto 
dollarisation in developing and transition economies? Is financial development by way of 
liberalisation the cause of asset substitution, currency substitution or de facto dollarisation? 
What are the main macroeconomic determinants of currency substitution and asset substitution? 
Are there any lines of causality among currency substitution, asset substitution and de facto 
dollarisation in developing and transition economies? This paper attempts to answer these 
questions through the analysis of the macrodynamic interlinks among the phenomena under 
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investigation. The central objective of this study, therefore, is to find out if financial sector 
development by way of liberalisation is the principal cause of de facto dollarisation in 
developing countries using Ghana as a case study. Specifically, this is designed to:
i. employ standard and comprehensive formulae to determine the degree of asset 
substitution, currency substitution, and de facto dollarisation in selected developing and 
transition countries;
ii. determine the inter-temporal correlations of asset substitution, currency substitution, and
de facto dollarisation for selected developing countries and economies in transition;
iii. estimate the short-run and long-run impact of financial sector development of asset 
substitution, currency substitution and de facto dollarisation;
iv. trace the direction of the line(s) of causality among asset substitution, currency 
substitution, de facto dollarisation, financial sector development, and inflation for Ghana; 
and,
v. evaluate the short-run and long-run macroeconomic determinants of asset substitution,
currency substitution, and de facto dollarisation with reference to Ghana.
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Financial Liberalisation and Financial Sector Development Theory
Theory on financial liberalisation leading to financial sector development originated with the 
works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) which focused on financial repression and the need 
for developing economies to allow real interest rates, along with other financial indicators, to be 
determined by market forces. Even though the theory traditionally focused on interest rates, the 
financial repression approach also incorporated the adverse effects of high reserve ratios and 
government controlled credit programmes, which together contributed to low savings, credit 
rationing and low investment. By this convention, artificial ceilings on interest rates reduce 
financial savings, capital accumulation, discourage the efficient allocation of resources and 
promote credit rationing in the assets market. 
Given that real interest rates under financial repressive circumstances are prevented from 
adjusting to market equilibrium, other non-market forms of clearing such as queuing
arrangements to ration the available credit in the form of auctions, quantitative restrictions 
including quotas as well as various forms of bidding systems which themselves may be open to 
nepotism or outright corrupt practices. In essence, the manifestations of financial sector 
development policy are to eliminate or at least reduce to the lowest possible minimum, 
repressive forces in the financial markets through market forces. Among the end products of the 
implementation of a perfect financial sector development policy are the emergence of 
competitive or equilibrium interest rates, improved higher and regular financial savings (and 
investment), increased availability of quality and innovative financial assets, the emergence of 
open currency markets or forex bureaux and a well-functioning capital market. 
As expected, not all economists agree to the concept of financial liberalisation. Proponents 
including Obstfeld (1998) and Mishkin (2001) insist that liberalising the financial sector helps 
improve the effective functioning of financial systems in many ways. Proponents believe that 
financial liberalisation is crucial to increasing the availability of loanable funds and allowing 
cross-country portfolio risk diversification which are a necessary condition for financial 
development. In sharp contrast, however, Diaz-Alejandro (1985), Stiglitz (1994, 2000) and 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detriagiache (1998), based especially on the experiences of Latin American 
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countries in the 1970s, strongly oppose the concept of financial liberalisation as a means of 
achieving financial development. In their view, wholesale liberalisation will most likely lead to 
macroeconomic instability and financial crises characterized by widespread bankruptcies, 
massive government interventions, nationalization of private sector institutions and low 
voluntary saving from the household sector. In fact, for developing and emerging economies 
Stiglitz (1994) argues in favour of government intervention in financial markets in the form of 
prudential regulation and supervision since, de facto, the government is the insurer of the 
financial systems. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) lend empirical support to this assertion.
It is important to emphasize that as a result of the implementation of financial liberalisation 
policy, the concomitant comprehensive reforms have led to the availability and improved 
mobility of myriad financial assets in different currency denominations. This implies that public 
access to foreign currencies and financial assets including credit and debit instruments such as 
bonds denominated in local and foreign currencies have become a more common phenomenon as 
compared to what prevails under the era of implementing financially repressive policies. The 
mere presence of forex bureaux, which was hitherto non-existent under an economy financially 
repressed under fixed exchange rate regime; and the subsequent emergence of forex bureaux 
under flexible foreign exchange rate regime which forms an integral part of financial 
liberalisation programme, make the genesis of de facto dollarisation in the form of currency 
substitution and asset substitution related activities in an emerging or transition economy.
2.2 De Facto Dollarisation, Currency Substitution and Asset Substitution
Currency Substitution is the situation where two or more currencies circulate within a single 
economy or region to facilitate transactions that are unrelated to international trade and finance. 
This phenomenon raises some interesting but difficult questions to which, hitherto, economists 
have been struggling to find clear–cut answers.
In theory, currency substitution (CS) and asset substitution (AS) are forms of dollarisation that 
need not go hand in hand given the difference between transactions and speculative motives for 
holding any kind of money. De facto dollarisation takes place when individuals and firms 
voluntarily choose to use foreign currency either for a transaction substitute (currency 
substitution) or a store of value substitute (asset substitution) for the monetary services of 
domestic currency. In a regime with de facto dollarisation, the recorded money supply falls short 
of the effective money supply due to the omission of foreign currency in circulation (FCC), 
which is typically unknown and not directly controllable by the local central bank. It is worth 
pointing out that currency substitution usually coexists with asset substitution. Asset substitution, 
on the other hand, does not necessarily imply the presence of currency substitution.1
Currency substitution is basically the preference and use of a foreign currency over the local 
currency as a medium of exchange and unit of account especially when it involves deferred 
payment; while asset substitution is the process of using foreign currency rather than the 
domestic currency as a store of value. In most countries, currency substitution or asset 
substitution is not de jure since it is not normal for a politically independent state to formally 
adopt a different country’s currency to wholly replace or displace its own local currency. 
Realistically, therefore, currency substitution or asset substitution which has become a common 
                                                
1 Refer to Baliňo, Bennett, and Bornesztein (1999) for details.
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phenomenon in developing and transition economies since the past two decades is mainly de 
facto. 
There is no precise definition for currency substitution. For instance, while Ramírez-Rojas 
(1985), Rojas-Suarez (1992), and Mizen and Pentecost (1996) define currency substitution as the 
substitution between two monies; El-Erian (1988), Cuddington (1989), Agénor and Khan (1992), 
Baliňo, et al. (1992), and Calvo and Végh (1992) define it as situation where the fundamental 
roles of a domestic currency such as store of value, medium of exchange and unit of account are 
replaced by a foreign currency. Similarly, according to Freitas (2002), currency substitution is a 
partial replacement of the domestic currency by a foreign currency either as a store of value, unit 
of account or medium of exchange. In the view of Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994) currency 
substitution is the total replacement of a domestic currency by another currency, which is usually 
official, as was experienced in post-independent Panama in 1904, when the US dollar became a 
legal tender2.
McKinnon (1982) defines currency substitution as the use of foreign currency and foreign 
currency denominated bonds by domestic residents. McKinnon postulates that much exchange 
rate volatility is due to the process of currency substitution since a shift in portfolios away from 
the domestic currency to foreign currencies, given the fixed supply of the local currency, will 
result in the depreciation of the domestic currency against its foreign counterparts. 
In the view of Savastano (1996), currency substitution would be less extensive in economies 
associated with well-developed financial systems with the capacity to offer a medium of 
exchange that can compensate users for inflation. Therefore, the role of financial institutional 
structure is critically vital in determining a country’s currency substitution behaviour. For 
instance, one crucial question that must be addressed is whether or not dollarisation3 exhibits a 
reversibility or non-reversibility behaviour.
Foreign exchange system reforms and development that pave the way for local people to hold 
foreign currency leads to high currency substitution under high inflationary and unstable 
economic circumstances (Akcay, et al., 1997 and Selcuk 1994, 2001).
Currency substitution and asset substitution have crucial implications for macroeconomic 
policies of any country. These include their effects on government revenue mobilization due to 
inflation and the efficiency of stabilizing macroeconomic programmes. Komárek and Melecký 
(2001) observe that where there is a high substitutability of the domestic currency with foreign 
currencies, it will be more difficult for governments to pursue deficit finance by printing money, 
which in the recent past, has been a common practice in most developing economies. The 
demand for foreign currencies, on one hand, enhances seigniorage, whilst on the other hand; it 
may act as an inflationary tax. Thus, in a dollarized economy, the resulting government revenue 
will be reduced at each level of inflationary tax (Komárek and Melecký, 2001).
In the same vein, it has been observed that to a reasonable extent, the displacement of a domestic 
currency by a foreign currency may promote macroeconomic stabilization and credibility of 
economic policies in small-open economies. For instance, in transition and developing 
                                                
2 Though Panama has its own currency, the US dollar is central in nearly all business transactions. In fact, the 
currency notes of Panama is the US dollar, while the local balboa exists only as coins.
3 (De facto) Dollarisation is used in this study to encompass currency substitution and asset substitution.
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economies, credibility can increase when foreign currencies in circulation depress monetary 
authorities’ effort to manipulate domestic currency. Thus, in the past, stabilization policies in 
developing and transition economies were characterized by the fixing of nominal exchange rates 
or establishing crawling pegs, which normally results in progressive appreciation (or over-
valuation) of exchange rates. However, when a domestic currency is significantly displaced by a 
foreign currency in an economy, there should automatically be narrower fluctuations in exchange 
rates to ensure stabilization (Komárek and Melecký, 2001).
Feige (2002a,b) and Sahay and Végh (1985) argue that currency substitution involves the use of 
foreign currency as a means of payment and unit of account, while asset substitution is basically 
the use of foreign currency as a store of value. In effect currency substitution is symmetric and 
reversible since any amount of substitution is capable of evoking a corresponding increase or 
decrease in the use of foreign currencies. Dollarisation, on the contrary, can be viewed as an 
asymmetric reaction to changeable determinants of the substitution process in the use of foreign 
currency (Komárek and Melecký, 2001). 
Theoretically, the domestic currency of an open economy, in the absence of foreign exchange 
control, can be readily converted into international tradable goods and other currencies. Other 
than its intrinsic attributes as a store of value, a medium of exchange and a unit of account, the 
domestic currency with the characteristics of liquidity and convertibility and hence transformable 
into any assets has a special position in economic agents’ portfolios. However, not all currencies 
were treated equally. The phenomenon of currency substitution basically reflects the demand by 
residents of an economy for a combination of currencies as a medium of exchange and other 
functions that money is expected to perform. In other words, there is an ordinal preference 
ranking for different currencies, which ultimately transmits into different degrees of currency 
substitution. 
In the view of monetary economists most often currency substitution is the long-run consequence 
of high and persistent inflation. This is apparently because casual evidence suggests that in 
countries with high inflation, foreign currencies are used firstly as a store of value, secondly, as a 
unit of account and finally as a medium of exchange. The process of currency substitution 
usually begins with substituting foreign money for the domestic money as a store of value, as 
residents in highly-prone inflation countries are easily aware that their wealth, if denominated in 
domestic currencies, will lose value promptly by negative real domestic interest rates.  That is to 
say, the opportunity cost of holding domestic money is higher as against having it invested in 
foreign currencies. Hence, in a liberalized transition or developing economy where an economic 
agent has the freedom of holding assets in different currencies, normally, a rational agent will 
like to diversify his portfolio of wealth in favour of foreign currencies and foreign currency 
denominated assets, because these currencies are capable of giving him a relatively higher degree 
of purchasing power stability against the background of expectations of higher inflation or 
exchange rate devaluations. As domestic inflation rate rises, people do not swiftly abandon the 
domestic medium of exchange for foreign substitutes. Rather, the substitution is gradual, with the 
extent of substitution increasing with the domestic inflation rate.
The second stage of currency substitution is the unit of account function of money when high 
inflation persists. This occurs when some prices, especially big-ticket items, are now being 
quoted in foreign currencies. The process completes itself as transactions begin to be conducted 
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in foreign currencies as a medium of exchange. In fact, as evidenced by the experience of 
transition economies in the early 1990s, the degree of currency substitution will not subside 
immediately after inflation has been stabilized to a moderate or low level. This requires a long 
adjustment process before the economic agents change their attitude towards their preference for
different kinds of money holdings.
The crucial factor that lies in the opportunity cost of holding domestic currency relative to 
foreign money is the anticipated rate of depreciation of the local currency. An increase in the 
anticipated rate of depreciation of domestic currencies raises the expected cost of holding 
domestic money vis-à-vis foreign currencies and this will result in an increase in the share of 
money balances held in foreign money, ceteris paribus.
Another argument against currency substitution is its hindrance to financial and economic 
developments. Empirical evidence shows that countries with a high degree of currency 
substitution tend to have low financial depth and less effectiveness of monetary policy. Clearly 
this affects the stability of the velocity of circulation of and the demand for the domestic 
currency, making it difficult for the central bank or monetary authorities in formulating and 
conducting effective monetary policy.    
It must, however, be pointed out that there are cases of currency substitution, usually at very low 
levels, based not on lack of confidence in a local currency but rather on ease of business 
transactions. For instance, Australia, Russia, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, and other small 
advanced and stable economies with fairly open trade and financial borders have always 
exhibited holdings and use of neighbouring currencies for purposes of transactions. The lesson 
here is that some dollarisation per se is not necessarily a reflection of poor economic conditions 
or ineffective macroeconomic policy in these countries.
2.3 Empirical Literature
An enormous body of empirical literature (Feige 1994, 1997; Porter and Judson 1996) reveal that 
averagely not less than 50% or between 40% and 60% of the US dollar circulate outside the US. 
For instance, by adopting a variant of proxy measure proposed by Feige in 1994, the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FED) gave the official 
estimate in the year 2001 as 50% of the $580 billion of the US dollars in circulation was held 
outside the US. These aggregate measures indicate that the amount of US currency held abroad is 
substantial. As at now, the measures are incapable of determining the specific locations of the 
US dollar held abroad.
Ho (2002) asserts that financial deepening goes side-by-side with high degree of currency 
substitution in Macao. Ho found out that both economic and financial sector developments have 
been impressive over the past decades, notwithstanding the strong presence of other foreign 
currencies in Macao. Nevertheless, currency substitution has indeed affected Macao’s financial 
structure to the extent that foreign currencies take dominance in all financial instruments 
available in the financial system.4
Seater (2002) found out that financial structure does not play any significant role in determining 
the degree of currency substitution in an economy; rather it is the level of income per head and 
                                                
4 See Appendix A for details.
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composition of expenditure for any given level of income that affect the magnitude of currency 
substitution a country experiences. However, it was found out that the relation between income 
and currency substitution is as complex as the dependence of currency substitution on the 
composition of expenditures. That is to say, like dependence on composition of expenditures, it 
is difficult to say that “high income increases (or decreases) the extent of currency substitution.”
There has been near consensus from empirical studies that incidents of currency substitution and 
asset substitution exhibit non-reversibility behaviour for countries that experienced high and 
persistent inflation for longer periods as compared to the reversibility behaviour exhibited by 
countries with moderate and/or short-lived high inflation rates. This implies that the higher and 
more persistent the inflation in any particular economy, the more inelastic or non-reversible is 
the demand for holding foreign currencies. This evidence of dollarisation non-reversible 
hysteresis for countries with longer periods of high and persistent inflation was revealed by 
Guiddotti and Rodriguez (1992) for Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay; Kamin and Ericsson 
(1993) for Argentina; Clements and Schwartz (1993) and Reding and Morales (1999) for 
Bolivia; Mueller (1994) for Lebanon; and Mongardini and Mueller (1999) for the Kyrgyz 
Republic. In contrast, for countries such as Egypt, Chile and Yemen that experienced moderate 
inflation rates or short-lived high inflation rates there were evidences of reversible dollarisation
(Mueller, 1994)5. So far, only Freitas (2002) concludes that differences in past levels of 
dollarisation and inflation fail to show a consistent pattern in Bolivia, Turkey and Indonesia.
In general, empirical evidences reveal that the higher the degree of currency substitution the 
lower the financial depth and the weaker the effectiveness of monetary policy of any economy. 
Invariably, this impacts on the stability of the velocity of currency in circulation as well as the 
demand for the local currency, which makes the central bank or monetary authorities ineffective 
in formulating and conducting monetary policy.
2.3.1 Evidences of Dollarisation in Developing and Transition Economies
From a historical perspective, the monetary status of the Hong Kong dollar in Macao can be 
traced back to the year 1865 when Hong Kong started to issue its own currency. The issuing 
bank, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, had a prestige to win general 
acceptance of its notes within the Chinese territories. Therefore, the Hong Kong dollar notes, on
account of its ease of portability, became a widely circulated currency within the region, 
including Macao. Since then, Macao residents seemed to be accustomed to having Hong Kong 
dollars in their portfolios, even after Macao created its own currency, the pataca, in 1905. 
Generally, within developing and transition economies, the possible paramount reasons for the 
high incidence of de facto dollarisation whether in the form of currency substitution, or asset 
substitution or any concurrent combinations of these phenomena include:
 Macroeconomic instability as a result of high rates of inflation, wide fluctuations and 
volatility of nominal exchange rates, wide interest rates spread, and the loss of confidence 
in the domestic currency;
 Episodes of financial market crisis and risk-averse attitude of investors, firms and 
households in an attempt to hedge against potential financial risk of holding local 
currency;
                                                
5 A similar observation was made by Sahay and Végh (1996) for some selected transition economies which 
experienced moderate or relatively shorter period high inflation rates.
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 A history of colonialism (i.e. the continuous link with former colonial masters in trade 
and public finance);
 Size of the economy and its openness and dependency on international trade;
 Lack of credible macroeconomic policy and non-autonomy of the central bank;
 Over-dependence on imports and continuous current account deficit;
 The lack of higher denomination of bank notes issued by the local central banks;
 The active prevalence of large underground or unofficial economic activities such as
money laundering, public sector corruption and bribery, the manufacturing (or smuggling 
routes or centres) of banned drugs;
 Political instability or uncertainty;
 Imperfect and costly money market information;
 Non-existing or underdevelopment of capital and money markets;
 Low involvement in international capital markets;
 Excessively high international reserves;
 Loss of confidence in the domestic economy due to a combination of the above factors; 
and,
 High level of international tourism and its allied socioeconomic activities.
3.0 METHODOLOGY
Dollarisation has been tested under a variety of specifications. Our analysis of currency 
substitution and asset substitution as components of de facto dollarisation in the Ghanaian 
economy is based on the approach that falls into three categories suggested by Komárek and 
Melecký, (2001). Specifically, we follow the portfolio balance approach suggested by 
Cuddington (1983) and Branson and Henderson (1985), which we further modify to reflect the 
conditions prevailing in the Ghanaian economy. For instance, since price levels are usually high 
in Ghana, we included inflation, which measures the rate of change in price index but not the 
consumer price index into our model. On Ghana, quarterly data ranging from the fourth quarter 
of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 2005 was used. The justification for the choice of the study 
period is linked to the fact that the financial liberalisation programme was initiated in September 
1987. Besides, there are no adequate confirmed data on the relevant variables on Ghana for 2006 
and beyond. This study classifies a country as highly dollarized if its dollarisation index (DDI) is 
25 percent or more; averagely dollarized if its DDI is 20 percent or more but less than 25 
percent; and lowly dollarized if its DDI is lower than 20 percent6.
A time series macroeconometric modelling was employed to identify the determinants of DDI,
asset substitution index (ASI) and currency substitution index (CSI)7 since the implementation of 
financial sector reforms programme in Ghana. Correlation coefficients are computed to help 
identify the cross-relationship among ASI, CSI and DDI. In order to empirically explore the 
potential existence of asset substitution and currency substitution concerning the effect of 
exchange rates in Ghana where currencies are assumed to compete as store of value within the
                                                
6 Baliňo, et al. (1999), classify countries as highly dollarized if their DI is greater than 30 per cent, whilst Winkler, 
et al. (2004) categorise countries as lowly dollarized if DI is less than 20%; highly dollarised if DI is greater than 
70% ; and medium dollarised if DI ranges between 20% and 70%.
7 This does not necessarily mean all the three phenomena will appear in the model specified for empirical analysis. 
In fact, as to which index, whether DDI, CSI or ASI or a combination of indices that would be included in the model 
will be dependent upon the findings of our studies indicating the particular phenomenon or a combination of 
phenomena is found to be prevalent in Ghana.
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banking system, the modified versions of the models developed by Giovannini and Turtleboom 
(1994) and Komárek and Melecký (2001) has been specified for evaluation. Specifically, the 
study followed the portfolio balance approach suggested by Cuddington (1983) and Branson and 
Henderson (1985), which was further modified to reflect the conditions prevailing in the 
Ghanaian economy. The transformation of the adopted models from linear to quadratic model 
which differs from the linear specification of the adopted models is to help capture the possibility 
of reversibility of the perceived tendency of FSD promoting ASI, CSI, and DDI.
Adopting the general to specific approach, first, a very general dynamic lag structure between the 
dependent and explanatory variables comprising their lagged levels and first differences is 
estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In the second stage, this overly long general 
specification is reduced into a parsimonious dynamic adjustment equation, using the variable 
deletion tests by ensuring that the overall summary statistics do not become significant, the 
Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria reach their minimum and so that the residuals do not 
violate the basic underlying classical assumptions of OLS.
3.1 Measurement Problems
Measurability is the major limitation in the empirical analysis of Financial Sector Development 
and dollarisation in the form of currency substitution and/or asset substitution. 
3.1.1 Financial Sector Development (FSD) Index
Proxies for financial development have been varied. It was presumed that countries with negative 
real interest rates were financially repressed, while those with positive interest rates were 
financially developed. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1993), however, argued that real interest rates 
are not a good indicator of financial repression, and that a better indicator of financial repression, 
or lack of it thereof, is the ratio of private sector credit to GDP8. Other common measures of 
financial sector development include nominal interest rates, credit to the private sector as a ratio 
of the total credit by commercial banks, financial deepening (M2/GDP), and stock price index in 
economies where capital market exists. 
3.1.2 Dollarisation, Currency Substitution and Asset Substitution Indices
The ratio of Foreign Currency Deposits (FCD) to broad money (M2) is the simplest proxy for 
currency substitution in an economy, although this approximation represents only the lower 
bound for the actual level of currency substitution, given that foreign currencies in circulation are 
omitted (Komárek and Melecký, 2001). In developing and transition economies where the 
financial sector is less developed and instability of the macroeconomy is a common feature, 
more foreign currencies are likely to be in circulation but it is practically difficult to quantify, 
and as at now impossible to accurately determine.
Sarajevo (2000) observes that the ideal measure of currency substitution is the summation of 
foreign currencies in circulation in an economy as a means of payment and store of value and all 
checking accounts and short-term deposits in foreign currencies held by residents in domestic 
banks and abroad. Sarajevo concedes that due to lack of relevant data in nearly all economies, 
most empirical studies concentrate on either the ratio of FCD  to M2, or the ratio of FCD to broad 
monetary aggregates which includes FCD.
                                                
8 In this study, financial deepening and credit to the private sector as a proportion to the total credit by commercial 
banks are used as measures of financial development.
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According to Ho (2003), currency substitution, if defined narrowly, occurs when a foreign 
currency displaces the domestic currency as a medium of exchange and thereby, accounting for a 
significant portion of narrow money (M1). Thus, in the case of developing and transition 
economies M1 may be defined as:
(1) M1 = TCC+LDD +FCD
where TCC is the total currency in circulation; LDD is the demand deposits denominated in the 
local currency; and FCD is the demand deposits denominated in foreign currencies. Since no 
data is ever collected on the foreign cash circulating in nearly all countries the world over, total 
currency in circulation (TCC) is virtually denominated in local currency only, while the ratio of 
demand deposits denominated in foreign currencies (FCD) to M1 is therefore used as a proxy for 
the degree of currency substitution in narrow money. Therefore, the currency substitution index9
(CSI) in relation to the medium of exchange function of money can be mathematically defined 
as:
(2) CSI =  FCD/M1
Furthermore, currency substitution can be evidenced in broad money supply (M2) in most 
developing and transition economies because foreign monetary assets play a key role in the store 
of value function of money. Consequently, Feige et al. (2002a, 2002b) and Ho (2003) suggest 
that when dollarisation primarily involves the use of foreign denominated monetary assets as 
substitutes for domestic ones in their capacity as store of value, it is useful to define it as an asset 
substitution index (ASI) and measured as the ratio of foreign denominated monetary assets to 
domestic denominated assets excluding currency outside banks10. Thus, mathematically ASI can 
be expressed as:
(3) ASI =FCD/(LDD+LTD) =FCD/(M2-LCC-FCD)
Conceptually, the overall currency substitution index or (de facto) dollarisation index (DDI) is 
determined by adding (2) and (3) together, so that:
(4) DDI= CSI + ASI
Since the motives for currency substitution and its implications can be quite different from those 
of asset substitution, we now turn to an examination of currency and asset substitution indices for 
the developing and transition economies.
Due to lack of data on  foreign currency in circulation (FCC), studies on the de facto
dollarisation process has been forced to accept the observable amount of foreign currency 
deposits (FCD) as a proxy for dollarisation. Studies of dollarisation and currency substitution, 
often associated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), employ the ratio of FCD to broad 
                                                
9 Feige et al. (2002a, 2002b) suggest a measure of the extent of currency substitution that shows the fraction of a 
nation’s total currency supply held in the form of foreign currency. Mathematically, currency substitution index 
(CSI) should explicitly be given as: CSI = FCC/(FCC+LCC).
10 When data on M2 and/or LTD are not available, but the measures of QM are available, ASI can be approximated 
by the ratio of FCD to total deposits, which equals LDD+QM. These two measures tend to be closely correlated.
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money (FCD/BM) as the measure of the extent to which countries are dollarized. We denote this 
traditional de facto dollarisation index (DDI) as:
(5) (DDI)  (FCD/BM) =FCD/M2)
When both asset substitution and currency substitution take place, or when FCDs are used by 
firms to make transactions with international partners, we define a comprehensive dollarisation 
index (CDI) that represents the fraction of a nation’s broad effective money supply composed of 
foreign monetary assets. Thus,
(6) CDI  (FCC+FCD)/(BM+FCC) =(FCC + FCD)/(M2+FCC)
It is obvious from this mathematical definition of CDI that there is currently no possible realistic 
measurement of CDI as long as FCC cannot be accurately determined practically or intuitively. 
The extent of de facto dollarisation depends upon various incentives to hold the different assets 
described in the denominators and numerators of the dollarisation indices.
3.2 The Granger-Causality Test: ASI, CSI, DDI, FSD and Inflation (INF)
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) hypothesized that one possible outcome of implementing a 
programme of financial development is a loss of seigniorage generating capacity for the 
government emerging from decreases in demand for the local currency in the presence of 
alternative financial assets normally denominated in different currencies. During high 
inflationary periods in particular, the demand for foreign currencies and foreign currency 
denominated financial assets upsurges precipitating currency substitution11. Currency 
substitution of any form can have significant implications for the capacity of the government to 
derive revenue normally in the form of inflation tax12 from money creation.
In order to verify empirically whether or not the implementation of Financial Sector 
Development (FSD) programme in Ghana is the cause of inflation, currency substitution, asset 
substitution and de facto dollarisation the study will employ the statistical test outlined by 
Granger (1969, 1988) and further developed by Sims (1972). 
The study, upon the selection of a reasonable lag length, l, corresponding to theories and 
reasonable beliefs about the longest time over which one of the variables could help predict the 
other, will run a bivariate regression involving the combinations of ASI, CSI, DDI, FSD, and INF
of the form:
0 1 1 1 1.............. ............t t l t l t l t lx x x y y              (3.2.1)
where
DDI = ASI+CSI; and FSD = credit to private sector as a ratio of total credits by 
commercial banks.
                                                
11 This occurs when the demand for foreign currency outstrips the demand for the domestic currency in the 
performance of the basic functions of money especially as a medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value.
12 Fischer (1982) and Friedman (1971) analyzing from the framework of the quantity theory of money pointed out 
that seigniorage can be obtained without necessarily creating inflationary pressure if high-powered money is 
adequately provided to meet the rapidly growing demand for goods and services in the economy. However, the fact 
remains that in practice, seigniorage is likely to result in inflation tax because that parallelism in the growth of 
money and the rate of real growth does not take place, especially in LDCs, since lack of simultaneous equilibrium 
conditions in the product, assets and foreign exchange markets.
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For this equation, the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis specified as 0...............1  l
will be evaluated using the reported F-statistics. It is expected a priori that there exist a uni-
directional line of causality from FSD through inflation (INF), ASI, CSI to DDI.
3.3 Unit Root Tests
The study commenced with the tests for stationarity of the endogenous and exogenous variables 
within the framework of Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test procedure. This test is important 
in order to avoid spurious regression which is common problem when estimating a regression 
line with data whose generated process follows a time trend. The ADF test requires estimating an 
equation of the form:
0 1 1 2
1
;
p
t t l t l t
l
y y t y z 

           H0: b=0; H1: b>0, (3.3.1)
where ty is a vector for all time series variables under consideration in a particular regression 
model; tz is the error term; l is the optimal lag length of each variable chosen according to the 
Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria such that first-differenced terms make tz a white 
noise. 
3.4 The Johansen Cointegration Test
In order to determine the number of equilibrium-correction terms that appear in the Dynamic 
Equilibrium-Correction Mechanism (DECM) models, the Johansen Cointegration Test is 
employed. This approach yield maximum likelihood estimators of the unconstrained 
cointegrating vector, and also helps to empirically determine the number of cointegrating vectors 
without relying on an arbitrary normalization.
3.5 The Models
Within the context of the Ghanaian economy and following Cuddington (1983), Brandson and 
Henderson (1985), Giovannini and Turtleboom (1994) and Komárek and Melecký (2001) the 
general mathematical models considered in this study are:
( ) ( , , , , )t t t t t tf DAB INF EXR INT FSD  (3.5.1)
where ( ) denotes the respective dependent variables ASI, CSI, and DDI such that 
DDI=ASI+CSI; DAB is domestic absorption (GDP-net exports) measuring the amount of 
transactions; INF is inflation measuring changes in price levels; EXR stands for exchange rate of 
the Ghanaian cedi to the US dollar; INT denotes interest rate spread and measured as the 
difference between lending rates and deposit rates of commercial banks; and FSD is an index for 
Financial Sector Development computed as a ratio of bank credit to the private sector out of total 
credits.
The corresponding specific Cointegrating Regression Models (CRMs) based on (3.5.1) specified
for evaluation are as follows:
2
1 2 3 4 5 6( )t t t t t t itCON DAB EXR INF INT FSD FSD               (3.5.2)
where i ranges from one to three so that the residual term, it , for each of the three dependent 
variables, ASI, CSI, and DDI is 1 2,t t  and 3t respectively. The constant term of the quadratic 
regression line is CON whereas FSD2is the square of FSD. All other variables are as previously 
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defined. For all the dependent variables, the expected signs of each of the explanatory variables
are that 1 2 3 5, , , , 0CON      whilst 4 6, 0.  
The DECM models that are determinable alongside (3.5.2) are the simple quadratic
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) models associated with the CRMs that are evaluated to 
provide short-run information about the phenomena under study are of the form:
  
4 4 4 4
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
4 4 4
2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( )
ˆ
t i t i i t i i t i i t i
i i i i
i t i i t i i t i it it
i i i
CON DAB EXR INF
INT FSD FSD  
   
   
   
  
                
         
   
  
(3.5.3)
where ˆ ~ (0)t I because ( )t and the explanatory variables are cointegrated such that residual
2~ (0, ).it iid  The composition of it is similar to that of it as observed in above (3.5.2). The 
symbol  represents the first-differenced form of the variables in the model. The coefficient of 
the various explanatory variables, , ,.........,M  , are the impact multipliers that measure the 
immediate impact that a change in the explanatory variables has on a change in the dependent 
variables. The feedback or adjustment effect is  and it indicates how much of the 
disequilibrium is being corrected.
3.6 Sources of Data
Quarterly data on domestic currency in circulation (LCC), foreign currency deposits (FCD), 
narrow money (M1), broad money (M2), nominal exchange rate (EXR), income measured as real 
GDP (INC), government spending (GSP), exports, imports, consumer price index (CPI), and 
interest rate spread (INT) are used. Sources of data included various editions of survey reports 
and publications of Central Banks of Ghana and the other selected developing and transition 
countries from the East European Countries (EEC), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
and Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries as well as Report of International Transportation of 
Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIR), International Monetary Fund (IMF).
4.0 THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES
4.1 Results of Unit Root Tests
The results of stationarity test, as presented in Table 4.1.1 have shown that only ASI, DDI, and 
INC are stationary on levels, hence I(0). All other variables used in this study are stationary after 
first-differencing and hence are I(1) with the exception of DAB, and EXR which are I(2) 
following a further differencing of their first-differences.
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Table 4.1.1 Results of Stationarity Tests
VARIABLE
NUMBER OF 
LAGS*
ADF TEST 
STATISTIC
CRITICAL 
VALUE
LEVEL OF 
SIGNIFICANCE 
(%)
ORDER OF 
INTEGRATION
ASI 1 -4.277902 -4.0990 1 I(0)
CSI 2 -4.970658 -4.1035 1 I(1)
DAB 5 -5.577534 -4.1135 1 I(2)
DDI 1 -4.110695 -4.0990 1 I(0)
EXR 4 -5.464302 -4.1109 1 1(2)
FSD 2 -6.640025 -4.1035 1 I(1)
FSD2 2 -6.717571 -4.1035 1 I(1)
INF 5 -3.581365 -3.4824 5 I(1)
INT 1 -6.289157 -4.1013 1 I(1)
Authors’ computations
* Number of lags determined according to the Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria
4.2 Results of Granger Causality Test
The empirical results revealed that within the Ghanaian context asset substitution drives currency 
substitution and de facto dollarisation within a one-quarter lag interval, whilst the rate of 
inflation for the last-two quarter Granger-causes asset substitution in the current quarter. The 
results of the Granger Causality Test are presented in Table 4.2.1 below.
Table 4.2.1: Results of Granger-Causality Test
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1988:4 2005:4
At Lag 1
Observation 68
At Lag 2 
Observation 67
  Null Hypothesis: F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob.
  CSI does not Granger Cause ASI 0.0412 0.8397
  ASI does not Granger Cause CSI 3.6453 0.0606*
  DDI does not Granger Cause ASI 0.0805 0.7776
  ASI does not Granger Cause DDI 3.9703 0.0505**
  INF does not Granger Cause ASI 5.2445 0.0253** 2.8364 0.0663*
  ASI does not Granger Cause INF 2.0270 0.1097 1.3783 0.2596
  FSD does not Granger Cause INF 3.3508 0.0718* 2.6258 0.0804*
  INF does not Granger Cause FSD 0.0523 0.8198 0.0071 0.9930
Authors’ computation
Notes: (1) * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%.
(2) Beyond lag 2 and up to lag 5, none of the variables significantly Granger-causes one another. At lags 6, 7 and 8 INF 
Granger-causes ASI. Again, INF Granger –causes FSD at lags 7 and 8, whilst FSD also Granger-causes CSI at lag 8. 
The study did not consider lags beyond 8 in this particular case.
(3) Variables included in the Granger-Causality Test are ASI, CSI, DDI, FSD and INF. Some of the test results are not 
reported in the Table due to their statistical insignificance.
The diagrammatical representation of the Granger-causality based on the results of lag one is 
illustrated in the Figure 4.2.1 below.
Figure 4.2.1: Tracing the Lines of Granger-Causality
FSD INF ASI CSI 
DDI
The finding that asset substitution Granger-causes currency substitution is in sharp contrast with 
the work of Baliňo, et al. (1999) which provided implied empirical evidence that currency 
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substitution must precede asset substitution and not the reverse as is the case for Ghana. This 
finding is, however, in consistency with the proposition of monetary economists on sequencing 
of dollarisation. According monetary economists, a foreign currency may serve first be used as a 
unit of account and store of value before later being used as a medium of exchange in an 
economy where dollarisation is in response to hyperinflation, currency depreciation and a history 
of bank confiscation.
Thus, since the evidences strongly indicate that financial sector development is the fundamental 
cause of inflation, asset substitution, currency substitution, and de facto dollarisation, there is the 
need to critically examine at the sequencing of the implementation of financial sector reform 
programmes in Ghana.
4.3 Degree of Dollarisation and Selected Monetary Aggregates in Developing and 
Transition Countries
Table 4.3.1: Indicators of Dollarisation and Selected Monetary Aggregates (1996-2005) 
DDI* DDI** ASI CSI FND INT VEL
Developing Economies 37.21 2917.32 149.86 2767.46 22.38 17.86 31.80
SSA Countries 35.70 235.81 162.80 73.01 48.71 24.83 27.55
Angola 56.2 444.26 289.62 154.64 20.91 48.26 19.86
Burundi 12.88 45.68 26.84 18.84 22.79 3.01 31.86
Congo, DR 37.82 395.82 337.57 58.25 3275.40 60.40 38.19
Ghana 27.65 126.42 84.09 42.33 21.72 13.31 37.53
São Tomé and Príncipe 38.11 157.68 91.04 66.65 32.71 16.49 19.61
Tanzania 22.55 105.47 44.87 60.60 21.26 14.25 26.93
Zambia 54.7 375.32 265.59 109.73 14.75 18.09 18.85
Other Developing Countries 38.37 5002.94 139.79 4863.15 19.03 12.43 35.10
Albania 21.04 98.21 42.97 55.24 0.06 3.58 29.67
Armenia 46.12 8750.35 -101.29 8851.64 12.75 17.41 43.49
Azerbaijan Republic 39.65 7928.96 -101.55 8030.51 13.73 9.46 43.29
Belarus 48.12 12480.28 -101.91 12582.20 18.04 15.19 17.03
Bosnia & Herzegovina 44.45 265.50 135.76 129.74 38.86 14.94 20.77
Cambodia 65.97 1905.90 1691.01 214.89 14.77 12.52 29.98
Kyrgyz Republic 24.01 3419.02 -101.77 3520.79 15.20 23.57 61.08
Latvia 31.62 5458.01 -102.24 5560.24 30.77 6.96 30.83
Moldova 24.38 4720.19 -102.91 4823.10 27.11 8.28 39.77
Transition Economies 30.23 1765.57 53.84 1711.73 24595.45 13.71 27.33
Bolivia 74.16 938.00 553.59 384.41 44.53 19.17 11.52
Egypt 18.96 107.56 28.39 79.17 84.40 4.54 13.86
Estonia 16.03 2524.31 -105.34 2629.64 36.04 4.91 18.32
Georgia 36.86 6617.99 -101.45 6719.44 10.90 23.71 50.39
Lithuania 25.23 98.54 55.86 42.68 25.87 6.21 27.89
Russian Federation 22.64 88.51 47.30 41.21 24.85 22.23 28.02
Ukraine 22.63 3639.10 -102.82 3741.92 24322.63 23.83 40.65
Vietnam 25.33 110.52 55.17 55.35 46.24 5.08 27.97
Overall Average 34.88 2533.40 117.85 2415.55 1174.01 16.74 30.31
Author’s computation where values are in percentages
Notes: DDI* computed as FCD/M2; DDI
** computed as the sum ASI and CSI; CSI computed as FCD/M1; ASI
computed as FCD/(M2-LCC-FCD); INT is interest rate spread calculated as the difference lending rate between 
deposit rate of commercial banks; VEL represents velocity of money and measured as LCC/M2.
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For most FSU, CIS and CEE countries asset substitution is negative with relatively high velocity 
of money, implying that for these countries, de facto dollarisation might not be principally due to 
high inflation rates at present or in the past, wide fluctuations of exchange rate, episode of bank 
confiscation, but probably as a consequence of their proximity to economic giants and high 
levels of international trade with neighbouring advanced economies. The study determined the 
extent of dollarisation and its components alongside some selected monetary aggregates for the 
24 developing and transition economies under consideration. In general, it was found that 
countries with high interest rate risk as a result of wide interest rate spread and low financial 
depth are those that experience relatively high CSI and DDI*. Countries that fall under this 
category include Angola, Zambia, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic, and Georgia. Even 
though Bolivia has a high financial depth, its velocity of money quite low and as a result, it this 
has culminated in the high level of CSI and DDI* the country experiences. 
The findings from Table 4.3.1 show that, generally, de facto dollarisation (DDI* or DDI**) 
together with its components asset substitution and currency substitution is high in both 
developing and transition economies with developing economies experiencing a higher degree of 
severity. Among the 16 developing countries under consideration only five countries, namely 
Burundi (12.9%), Tanzania (22.6%), Albania (21.0%), Kyrgyz Republic (24.0%) and Moldova 
(24.4%) can be classified as experiencing relatively low and below 25 percent degree of 
dollarisation when traditionally measured as DDI*. For this same period among the transition 
economies under investigation, apart from Bolivia (74.2%) and Georgia (36.9%), de facto
dollarisation is relatively low and ranges roughly between a low of 16.0% for Estonia to a high 
of 25.3% for Vietnam.
Currency substitution is very high in all countries under investigation resulting in an overall 
average of 2415.6% with SSA experiencing the least mean of 73.0% as against a high of 
4863.2% for the nine other developing countries. Here again, Burundi experienced the lowest 
CSI of 18.4% while Belarus, another developing country experienced, the highest of 12,582.2% . 
With the exception of Ghana, there exists a negative correlation between velocity of money and 
at least a component of de facto dollarisation for all countries under study (see Appendix B for 
details).
4.4 Correlation Coefficients of De Facto Dollarisation and its Components for Developing 
and Transition Countries
The results of the correlation coefficients have shown that there is no significant difference 
between CSI and DDI** because across countries they are highly positively correlated. The 
correlation coefficients of CSI-DDI** is more perfect for FSU, CIS and CEE countries than for 
SSA countries. The high positive correlation between DDI* and DDI** is a clear testimony that 
the measurement dollarisation by the two procedures suggested do not really matter because they 
move very closely together across-nations.
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Table 4.4.1: Country-Based Correlation Coefficients of ASI, CSI, and DDI (1996-2005)
ASI-CSI ASI-DDI* ASI-DDI** CSI-DDI* CSI-DDI** DDI*-DDI**
Developing Economies 0.740 0.8559 0.8513 0.8964 0.9347 0.91455
SSA Countries 0.783 0.8845 0.9560 0.8493 0.8893 0.88402
Angola 0.961 0.9219 0.9972 0.9444 0.9787 0.93519
Burundi 0.994 0.9903 0.9990 0.9784 0.9977 0.98703
Congo, DR 0.815 0.6398 0.9988 0.8935 0.8423 0.67031
Ghana 0.778 0.9639 0.9931 0.8681 0.8458 0.97928
São Tomé and Príncipe 0.807 0.7355 0.9720 0.9573 0.9231 0.85965
Tanzania 0.580 0.9906 0.7424 0.6441 0.9763 0.79271
Zambia 0.545 0.9495 0.9895 0.6592 0.6609 0.96396
Other Developing 
Countries 0.707 0.8336 0.7698 0.9330 0.9700 0.93831
Albania 0.479 0.9567 0.7866 0.6394 0.9188 0.87998
Armenia 0.898 0.9692 0.8976 0.9658 1.0000 0.96585
Azerbaijan Republic 0.868 0.9568 0.8681 0.9717 1.0000 0.97168
Belarus 0.947 0.9829 0.9472 0.9703 1.0000 0.97030
Bosnia & Herzegovina 0.942 0.9477 0.9777 0.9845 0.9916 0.98396
Cambodia 0.776 0.7500 0.9974 0.9867 0.8194 0.79405
Kyrgyz Republic 0.924 0.9750 0.9246 0.9836 1.0000 0.98368
Latvia -0.354 0.0107 -0.3536 0.9260 1.0000 0.92603
Moldova 0.883 0.9534 0.8828 0.9692 1.0000 0.96922
Transition Economies 0.848 0.9508 0.9226 0.9548 0.9710 0.98752
Bolivia 0.944 0.9807 0.9904 0.9506 0.9804 0.98180
Egypt 0.987 0.9993 0.9929 0.9892 0.9991 0.99441
Estonia 0.930 0.9540 0.9302 0.9890 1.0000 0.98902
Georgia 0.796 0.9108 0.7964 0.9685 1.0000 0.96850
Lithuania 0.850 0.9583 0.9759 0.9630 0.9446 0.99670
Russian Federation 0.973 0.9904 0.9958 0.9832 0.9901 0.99398
Ukraine 0.838 0.9226 0.8384 0.9816 1.0000 0.98163
Vietnam 0.469 0.8900 0.8604 0.8133 0.8537 0.99414
Overall Average 0.776 0.8875 0.8750 0.9159 0.9468 0.93888
Authors’ computation
4.5 Estimated Regression Results for Ghana
The empirical results as presented in Table 4.5.1 unearth the short-run and long-run 
macroeconomic determinants of asset substitution, currency substitution and de facto
dollarisation with reference to Ghana. 
The long-run performance of the models is above average given the reported value of R-squares 
and DW statistics. The par average performance of the Cointegrating models is appreciable given 
the quarterly time series data are used which under many circumstances might causes 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. Diagnostic results based on correlation 
coefficient matrix using the threshold of 0.90, does not suggest any severe presence of 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables except in the case of in the case of FSD and 
FSD2. This is normal given the nature of the relationship between these two variables in the 
estimated regression model. It can, thus, be concluded that even though multicollinearity exists 
in the model it is not a serious threat to undermine the reliability of the estimated coefficients. 
Perhaps, the main limitation posed by this problem is the significant estimated coefficients. The 
F-statistics have also shown that the explanatory variables are jointly statistically significant in 
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explaining the long-run variations in asset substitution, currency substitution and de facto
dollarisation. It can, therefore, be concluded that the empirical results of estimating the long-run 
equilibrium relationship is statistically efficient, unbiased and reliable.
Table 4.5.1: Estimated Results of Modelling ASI, CSI and DDI by OLS
The ASI Models The CSI Models The DDI Models
Explanatory Variables LRERM t-statistic LRERM t-statistic LRERM t-statistic
CON -0.809321 (-0.912) 0.131164 (0.666) -1.161909 (-0.996)
DAB -0.017801 (-2.967)*** -0.015305       (-1.149) -0.205911 (-3.291)***
EXR 0.021632 (3.388)*** 0.020714 (2.029)** 0.030941 (3.686)***
INF 0.094510 (2.577)** -0.019846 (-2.433)** 0.061602 (2.180)**
INT -0.008016 (-0.559) 0.075317 (2.361)** 0.165355 (0.876)
FSD 3.371426 (1.810)* -0.085553 (-0.196) 4.227280 (1.937)*
FSD2 -1.891718 (-1.886)* 0.173365 (0.659) -2.051967 (-1.774)*
Summary Statistics
R-squared 0.638850 0.524388 0.625736
Adjusted R-squared 0.574868 0.468684 0.570162
Durbin-Watson stat 1.808933 1.709143 1.803992
F-statistic 5.296009 [0.000]*** 7.618585 [0.000]*** 7.660706 [0.000]***
Cointegration Test Stat -6.417865 {-2.597}*** -3.453351 {-2.598}*** -5.201127 {-2.598}***
Explanatory Variables DECMM DECMM DECMM
CON -0.036010 (-1.011) 0.010862 (1.516) -0.031862 (-0.062)
∆(•(-1)) 0.273811 (2.579)** 0.312108 (2.880)*** 0.286935 (2.547)**
∆(DAB(-3)) -6.59E-06 (-2.495)**
∆(INF) -0.020546 (-2.972)*** -0.030541 (-2.669)*** -0.158101 (-1.878)***
∆(INF(-3)) 0.036374 (3.021)***
∆(INF(-4)) -0.019580 (-3.342)*** -0.029474 (-2.238)**
∆(EXR(-1)) 0.001080 (3.584)***
∆(EXR(-3)) 0.022610 (1.675) -8.08E-05 (-2.621)** 0.025506 (2.338)**
∆(INT(-1)) -0.027861 (-1.462)
∆(INT(-2)) 0.029236 (2.031)**
∆(INT(-4)) 0.022551 (1.648) 0.005572 (2.378)**
∆(FSD) 0.977778 (3.960)*** 1.462865 (4.339)***
∆(FSD(-2)) 2.883224 (2.233)**
∆(FSD(-3)) 0.533142 (2.420)**
∆(FSD(-4)) -3.591278 (-2.637)** -5.715296 (-2.965)***
∆(FSD2) 0.761833 (3.448)***
∆(FSD2(-2)) -2.433772 (-3.046)*** 0.705139 (2.966)***
∆(FSD2(-3)) -0.350564 (-2.569)**
∆(FSD2(-4)) -2.360448 (-2.795)*** -3.510130 (-2.929)***
RESIDi(-1) -0.980593 (-7.11)*** -0.424960 (-4.511)*** -1.010729 (-6.378)***
Summary Statistics 
R-squared 0.717760 0.735226 0.630554
Adjusted R-squared 0.658056 0.636909 0.568979
BGSC LM  Stat 0.067237 [0.935058] 0.444015 [0.643912] 0.458289 [0.634894]
RESET Stat 1.001423 [0.415886] 1.798938 [0.119808] 2.680644 [0.070768]*
F-statistic 12.02187 [0.0000]*** 8.443853 [0.0000]*** 10.24053 [0.0000]***
ARCH Test Stat 0.431773 [0.513592] 1.428058 [0.236950] 0.087075 [0.768931]
Authors’ computations Notes: *10% significance level; **5% significance level; ***1% significance level; ∆= 
first difference; F-probabilities in square parentheses; Critical Values in curly parentheses of the form {}. LRERM= 
Long-Run Equilibrium Regression Model; DECMM= Dynamic Equilibrium-Correction Mechanism Model
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On the whole, in Ghana, the current level of financial sector development as well as the level 
which prevailed during the past-two or past-three quarter is singularly the most significant cause 
of asset substitution and de facto dollarisation in the short-run. For instance, for any one percent
further improvement in financial sector development at any particular time, asset substitution 
increases by 98% whilst de facto dollarisation increases by 571%. Currency substitution 
increases by 53% when there is a mere one percent improvement in financial sector development 
by one percent in past-three quarter. The degree of financial sector development during the last-
four quarter, however, has the tendency of reducing asset substitution and de facto dollarisation 
in the present quarter. There exists the probability that the extent to which continuous 
improvement in the development of the financial sector induces de facto dollarisation, asset 
substitution and currency substitution will terminate after some point even in the short-run.
It is worthy to note that any disequilibrium that occurs in the short-run can be corrected in the 
long-run given the negative sign of the residuals and the statistical levels of significance under 
all cases. The performance of the DECM models can be described as highly acceptable since the 
R-squares have shown that in all cases, between 50% and 70% of the variations in the dependent 
variables are caused by the explanatory variables in each model. None of the models suffered 
from specification errors, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation or any of the fundamental 
assumptions underlying OLS.
5.0 THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
From the estimated results, the summary of the empirical findings are as follows:
 Across developing and transition economies de facto dollarisation is generally highly 
predominant, but the motives for holding foreign currencies as well as the motivation for 
depositing foreign currencies with banks vary widely especially between SSA and 
countries from CEE and FSU. The average de facto dollarisation in the sampled 
developing countries is 37% with SSA being 36% as against 30 for countries in 
transition. Similarly, asset substitution and currency substitution are higher in developing 
countries than their counterparts in transition. For developing countries, on the average, 
ASI and CSI are 150% and 2768% with SSA being 163% and 73% compared to 54% and 
1712% for countries in transition.
 CSI is a better proxy for measuring comprehensive dollarisation index of the form 
DDI**=ASI+CSI given that the average coefficient for DDI*-CSI is 95% compared to 
DDI*-ASI of 88% and DDI*-DDI** of 94%.
 Broadly, countries that experience extremely high currency substitution of over 1000% 
also experience around -100% asset substitution. These countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
Republic, Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia and Moldova are FSU countries with the 
remaining Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine being CEE countries. It is in only in Latvia that 
currency substitution and asset substitution appears to be substitutes to each other.
 Financial sector development programme is the undisputed genesis of de facto
dollarisation in the form of asset substitution and currency substitution in Ghana in the 
short-run in particular. In fact, the results of the Granger-Causality were consistent with 
this finding by revealing that the root cause of de facto dollarisation is financial sector 
development. The line of Granger-causality is uni-directional running from financial 
sector development through inflation, asset substitution, to currency substitution. It is 
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asset substitution that directly Granger-causes currency substitution and de facto
dollarisation.
 Exchange rate depreciation is a propeller of higher de facto dollarisation in the form of 
asset substitution and currency substitution in the long-run. This makes exchange rate 
depreciation the most consistent prime maker of higher de facto dollarisation and its 
agents in Ghana in the long-run.
 The more developed the financial sector, the higher the incidence of de facto dollarisation 
and currency substitution within the Ghanaian economy in the long-run. The extent to 
which financial sector development induces de facto dollarisation and asset substitution 
will, however, terminate and become reversible in the long-run.
 Inflation has as usual produced a mixed result. In the long-run, even though higher levels 
of inflation are the genesis of asset substitution and de facto dollarisation, higher rates of 
inflation cannot be accused of being directly responsible for higher incidences the level 
of currency substitution. As revealed by the results of the Granger-causality, perhaps, 
higher rates of inflation can only be agent of currency substitution indirectly through 
asset substitution.
 The key and consistent macroeconomic determinants of asset substitution, currency 
substitution and de facto dollarisation in the short-run and long-run within the context of 
the Ghanaian economy are exchange rate, inflation and financial sector development. 
Interest rate spread is a relevant determinant of currency substitution in both the short-run 
and long-run and only short-run determinant of asset substitution with no impact on de 
facto dollarisation. In the short-run, domestic absorption determines currency substitution 
only but with long-run effects on asset substitution and de facto dollarisation.
6.0 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
One of the implications from the empirical findings is that in extremely high dollarized 
countries, economic agents prefer to use foreign currencies for business transactions motives but 
would hold their local currency for speculative motives as opposed to relatively less dollarized 
countries. This might possibly be a consequence of improved efficiency and reliability of the 
domestic banking system in these economies which might limit in incidence of currency trade 
and rent seeking activities connected to foreign currencies. It must be pointed out that the high 
incidence of de facto dollarisation in the forms of currency substitution and asset substitution 
follow a consistent historical process. The severity of these de facto dollaraistion has the 
potential of impairing the effectiveness of fiscal policies particularly as far as tax revenue 
mobilisation is concerned. In an extremely highly dollarized country, for instance, tax evasion 
can be high because in such economies, underground economic activities including trading in 
illicit commodities and services, corruption, corporate fraud and rent-seeking activities are likely 
to be more convenient and enhanced.
In an economy where de facto dollarisation is extremely high, the quantum of effective or 
disguised money supply will definitely be higher than the size of reported domestic money 
supply. Naturally, this makes money and exchange rates control and management by the Central 
Bank a more daunting task. Thus, because of the high elasticity with which a foreign currency 
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can be substituted for a local currency, and vice versa, the implementation of monetary policy 
becomes less effective and associated with uncontrollable capital mobility across nations and 
riskier foreign exchange policy interventions, at least, in the very short-run. It is, therefore 
recommended that financial liberalisation for further development of the financial sector should 
be focussed on improved financial services such as off-shore banking, increasing access and 
decreasing cost of international money transfers through official routes especially to developing 
and transition countries.
The empirical finding that financial sector development promotes de facto dollarisation even 
though financial sector adjustment programme which was launched two decades ago might have 
a strong justification for improving the financial market performance, perhaps, its timing and 
sequencing might lack the right policy mix and direction. In connection with this finding, the 
study recommends that in order to reduce resultant financial fragility and risks and make the 
implementation of monetary policy more effective, there is the need for monetary authorities of 
Ghana to re-appraise the on-going financial reform programmes. This way a more prudent 
sequencing of financial reforms policy implementation would be identified and followed to 
minimize the current risk exposure within the financial system.
The results of this study also implies that extent to which Ghana can reduce its dependency on 
international economy and increase domestic absorption can, to a very large extent, minimise the 
high incidence of de facto dollarisation in the short-run, and to some extent the long-run. This is 
evidenced from the significant and consistent negative impact of domestic absorption on asset 
substitution, currency substitution and de facto dollarisation in Ghana. It is, therefore, suggested 
that expansionary economic policies such as a reduction in income tax, reduction in the rate of 
interest to boost domestic investment and the creation of job opportunities to reduce the rate of 
unemployment that would enhance domestic absorption should be implemented.
Both in the short-run and the long-run, the impact of inflation on de facto dollarisation, asset 
substitution and currency substitution is mix. This consistency violates the a priori expectations 
and suggests that the transmission mechanism of the effects of inflation on dollarisation and its 
components is complex and indirect. From the estimated results, for instance, in the long-run, a 
higher rate of inflation by one percent accounts for a 0.10% and 0.06% rise in asset substitution
and de facto dollarisation respectively but a marginal fall of 0.02% in currency substitution. On 
the contrary, in any specific current quarter and the previous fourth-quarter, higher rates of 
inflation marginally reduce asset substitution and currency substitution in the short-run. This can 
possibly be attributed to the wrongful price expectations and money illusions, in the short-run, on 
the part of the household sector especially where a significant proportion of the population are 
not educated and, hence, suffer from telescopic analytical aptitude. Nonetheless, since the line of 
causality is traced from asset substitution through currency substitution to de facto dollarisation, 
it can be concluded that in the long-run, inflation promotes de facto dollarisation in Ghana.
Another probable explanation to this finding is that when price levels are high in a constrained 
low-income economy such as that of Ghana, the cost of living rises and fewer economic units 
would have the ability and willingness to hold money for any other purpose except for 
transactions motive directed at acquiring basic necessities of life such as food and clothing as a 
consequence of decreasing purchasing power. Under this circumstance, economic agents would 
rather be compelled to erode their savings and reserves which imply fewer deposits in local and 
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foreign currencies especially as a store of value13, and hence lower levels of de facto
dollarisation in the economy in the short-run. The study, therefore, recommends that inflation 
should be reduced in order to rates not exceeding the growth rate of real gross domestic product 
so that economic agents could have confidence in the local currency.
Higher interest rate spread suggests higher interest rate risks which exposes economic agents to 
higher financial risks and insecurity. This compels economic agents to diversify their investment 
portfolios in favour of foreign currency denominated assets. Therefore, the significant manner in 
which interest rate spread promotes currency substitution and de facto dollarisation especially in 
the long-run should inform Central Banks to design and implement monetary policies aimed at 
stabilizing the financial market by way of narrowing interest rate spread in the financial markets.
As the empirical findings reveal that depreciation of the Ghanaian cedi result in asset substitution 
currency substitution and de facto dollarisation in the long-run in particular, it is recommended 
that effective policies aimed at stabilizing the macroeconomy should be prudently designed and 
implemented in order to minimize the high incidence of de facto dollarisation. For instance, 
policy interventions for increasing domestic output in a sustainable manner that would in the 
long-run generate surpluses for exports of final and intermediate goods and subsequently reduce 
the dependency on imports of basic commodities should be rigorously pursued.
7.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study was set out generally to find out if the massive financial liberalisation programmes 
embarked upon by developing and transition countries since the 1980s as way of promoting 
financial sector development is the principal cause of de facto dollarisation in the form of asset 
substitution and currency substitution using Ghana as a case study. The study also evaluated the 
extent as well as the cross-relations of asset substitution, currency substitution and de facto
dollarisation in 24 sampled developing and transition economies. Overall, by narrow definition, 
de facto dollarisation is 35% across countries. By comprehensive measurement of de facto
dollarisation averaged 2533% decomposed into asset substitution of 2416% and asset 
substitution of 118% for the 24 sampled countries. In effect, de facto dollarisation is more of a 
currency issue than an asset issue possibly because in developing and transition economies, 
incomes are relatively and close to the subsistence level, hence, economic agents find it difficult 
to save in any form of currency denomination.
Again, even though the degree of asset substitution, currency substitution and de facto
dollarisation is high in both developing and transition countries, in the face of lower financial 
deepening and higher interest rate spread, the incidences of asset substitution, currency 
substitution and de facto dollarisation are relatively higher in developing countries than countries 
in transition.
The empirical results reveal that exchange rate, inflation and financial sector development are 
significant and consistent macroeconomic determinants of asset substitution, currency 
substitution and de facto dollarisation in the short-run and long-run. Though, financial sector 
development is the root cause of de facto dollarisation in Ghana both in the short-run and the 
                                                
13 This connotes asset substitution which the study has identified as the component of dollarisation initially affected 
by higher inflation (refer to the results of Granger-Causality Test for details).
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long-run, there is the opportunity for reversibility. Thus, further development of the financial 
sector after some time will no longer lead to de facto dollarisation or any of its components.
A policy recommendation for action is that monetary authorities in developing and transition 
countries should formulate and implement policies geared towards financial markets integration 
and transformation of the curb financial markets into the formal sector so as to reduce the 
tendency of using unapproved routes for international remittances into their economies. Again, it 
would be prudent and imperative for governments of developing countries, in particular, to 
ensure fiscal discipline and stabilization of the domestic currency against foreign currencies so 
that rent seeking activity in the form of currency trade does not look attractive to economic 
agents. Financial innovations and the development of the capital market in developing and 
transition economies should be accelerated to provide various investment options to potential 
investors. This way, de facto dollarisation in the form of asset substitution is likely to be 
minimized since there would be wider availability of higher interest-bearing financial assets than 
foreign currencies in these economies. Obviously, controlling inflation to rates not exceeding the 
real gross domestic product growth rate would be a sure way of making the public have 
confidence in the domestic currency to reduce de facto dollarisation in form of currency 
substitution emerging from loss of public confidence in the local currency.
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Appendix A: Structure of Money Supply (M2) by Currency Macao
Macao: Structure of Money Supply M2, by Currency
Year
M2 (in 10
6
patacas) MAP (%)
HKD 
(%)
OFC 
(%) DDI=FCD/M2
1985 9,250.10 26.6 60.1 13.2 2.75564
1986 11,092.70 25.6 54.5 19.9 2.90625
1987 14,281.60 22.5 51.8 25.8 3.44889
1988 19,990.30 19.2 56.4 24.4 4.20833
1989 24,264.90 20.8 55.3 23.9 3.80769
1990 30,658.80 22.8 49.1 28.1 3.38596
1991 41,944.30 22.7 51.3 26.0 3.40529
1992 50,800.60 24.2 50.7 25.1 3.13223
1993 54,312.10 26.3 51.0 22.7 2.80228
1994 61,213.30 27.1 55.6 17.3 2.69004
1995 69,443.60 29.0 56.3 14.7 2.44828
1996 74,332.70 29.9 55.4 14.6 2.34114
1997 78,182.90 30.5 53.4 16.1 2.27869
1998 80,627.60 30.6 53.3 16.1 2.26797
1999 86,096.30 32.5 51.2 16.3 2.07692
2000 84,917.90 27.3 52.4 20.2 2.65934
2001 91,550.00 28.5 51.2 20.2 2.50526
2002 98,959.60 27.8 51.8 20.4 2.59712
2003 111,090.00 26.9 54.0 19.1 2.60145
2004 120,947.00 24.6 53.8 21.6 3.01232
2005 135,659.80 26.3 56.4 20.3 2.88909
Source: 
Computed by authors based on data obtained from Monetary Authority of Macao (AMCM) Annual 
Reports, various issues.
Note: MAP stands for Macao Patacas; HKD denotes the Hong Kong Dollar; whilst OFC represents other foreign 
currencies.
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Appendix B
Country-Based Correlations of De Facto Dollarisation and Velocity of Money (1996-2005)
ASI-VEL CSI-VEL DDI*-VEL DDI**-VEL FND-VEL INT-VEL
Developing Economies -0.2629 -0.6312 -0.5578 -0.4773 -0.4375 0.1073
SSA Countries 0.0491 -0.3098 -0.2276 -0.0203 -0.3136 -0.0008
Angola -0.2152 -0.4404 -0.2909 -0.2777 0.3485 -0.7932
Burundi -0.7391 -0.7196 -0.8078 -0.7324 -0.7182 -0.4499
Congo, DR 0.5745 0.0782 -0.1627 0.5410 0.6389 -0.3421
Ghana 0.6077 0.0573 0.3965 0.5263 -0.3096 -0.2949
Sao Tome and Principe 0.4876 -0.0661 -0.2298 0.2912 -0.5129 0.4619
Tanzania -0.8459 -0.7765 -0.9094 -0.8631 -0.7252 0.8082
Zambia 0.4741 -0.3015 0.4106 0.3724 -0.9169 0.6042
Other Developing 
Countries -0.5055 -0.8812 -0.8145 -0.8327 -0.5338 0.1914
Albania -0.1412 -0.6587 -0.4208 -0.5268 -0.3439 -0.4357
Armenia -0.8481 -0.9673 -0.9304 -0.9673 -0.7759 0.9107
Azerbaijan Republic -0.6568 -0.9383 -0.8366 -0.9383 -0.8389 0.7264
Belarus -0.8368 -0.8266 -0.8682 -0.8266 -0.6800 0.3955
Bosnia & Herzegovina -0.7396 -0.8975 -0.9018 -0.8490 0.5104 -0.7266
Cambodia -0.6686 -0.9748 -0.9930 -0.7187 -0.7458 -0.6600
Kyrgyz Republic -0.6494 -0.8602 -0.7807 -0.8601 -0.0304 -0.2397
Latvia 0.6120 -0.9523 -0.7840 -0.9523 -0.9896 0.9056
Moldova -0.6213 -0.8550 -0.8151 -0.8549 -0.9105 0.8460
Transition Economies -0.4796 -0.7637 -0.6564 -0.6640 -0.7564 0.3325
Bolivia -0.9444 -0.9747 -0.9746 -0.9703 -0.7748 -0.5513
Egypt -0.8403 -0.8247 -0.8506 -0.8309 -0.8700 -0.7720
Estonia -0.7519 -0.9086 -0.8701 -0.9085 -0.9279 0.9244
Georgia -0.7131 -0.9780 -0.9131 -0.9780 -0.8958 0.7050
Lithuania 0.1715 -0.3617 -0.1061 -0.0431 -0.8651 0.4923
Russian Federation -0.2446 -0.3562 -0.3589 -0.2905 0.1366 0.2878
Ukraine -0.6395 -0.8989 -0.8391 -0.8989 -0.9259 0.7909
Vietnam 0.1256 -0.8071 -0.3386 -0.3917 -0.9287 0.7826
Overall Average -0.3351 -0.6754 -0.5906 -0.5395 -0.5438 0.1823
Authors’ computations
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Appendix C: Results of Johansen Multivariate Likelihood Cointegration Tests
I(1) VARIABLES
Sample: 1988:4 2005:4; Included observations: 66; Lags interval: 1 to 2
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data; Series: CSI INT INF FSD FSD2
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s)
0.437623 79.82996 68.52 76.07       None **
0.261210 41.84155 47.21 54.46    At most 1
0.180823 21.86061 29.68 35.65    At most 2
0.096902 8.696546 15.41 20.04    At most 3
0.029401 1.969584   3.76   6.65    At most 4
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Unnormalized Cointegrating Coefficients:
CSI INT INF FSD FSD2
1.313376 -0.049920 0.015812 -2.955620 0.977648
-0.982965 0.030453 0.006405 5.836408 -3.564503
-1.518759 -0.016265 -0.001059 -5.022681 2.952242
0.407644 -0.012310 -0.000967 3.456035 -2.435066
-0.151153 0.003330 -0.000729 -1.145408 0.461827
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 1 Cointegrating Equation(s)
CSI INT INF FSD FSD2 C
1.000000 -0.038009 0.012039 -2.250399 0.744378 1.249041
(0.00791) (0.00274) (1.09236) (0.60590)
Log likelihood -37.43093
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 2 Cointegrating Equation(s)
CSI INT INF FSD FSD2 C
1.000000 0.000000 -0.088309 -22.19098 16.33003 8.433158
(0.21947) (58.7693) (42.7261)
0.000000 1.000000 -2.640123 -524.6259 410.0501 189.0102
(5.98136) (1601.68) (1164.44)
Log likelihood -27.44045
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 3 Cointegrating Equation(s)
CSI INT INF FSD FSD2 C
1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.238947 -0.736334 -0.749315
(0.75319) (0.48898)
0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 175.8416 -100.1706 -85.51150
(27.3302) (17.7431)
0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 265.3162 -193.2564 -103.9806
(75.5435) (49.0438)
Log likelihood -20.85842
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 4 Cointegrating Equation(s)
CSI INT INF FSD FSD2 C
1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.083506 -0.334877
(0.05824)
0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 16.18795 -26.69103
(4.54558)
0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 -17.69035 -15.23016
(7.57163)
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 -0.661724 -0.334508
(0.02486)
Log likelihood -17.49494
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I(2) VARIABLES
Sample: 1988:4 2005:4; Included observations: 66
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
Series: EXR DAB 
Lags interval: 1 to 2
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s)
0.357115 29.57588 15.41 20.04       None **
0.006310 0.417758   3.76   6.65    At most 1
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Unnormalized Cointegrating Coefficients:
EXR DAB
0.000114 -7.40E-09
-0.000123 1.67E-08
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 1 Cointegrating Equation(s)
EXR DAB C
1.000000 -6.50E-05 -1801.893
(1.3E-05)
Log likelihood -1463.208
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Appendix D: Graphical Representation of Residuals
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